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Abstract 
Resolving major societal challenges, such as stagnated economic growth or wasted resources, heavily 
relies on successful project delivery. However, projects are notoriously hard to deliver successfully, 
partly due to their interconnected nature which makes them prone to cascading failures. We deploy a 
model of cascading failure to temporal network data obtained from an engineering project, where 
tasks constituting the entire project and inter-dependencies between tasks correspond to time-stamped 
nodes and edges, respectively. We numerically evaluate the performance of six strategies to mitigate 
cascading failures. It is assumed that increased time between a pair of inter-connected tasks acts as a 
buffer, preventing a failure to propagate from one task to another. We show that, in a majority of 
cases that we explored, temporal properties of the activities (i.e., start and end date of each task in the 
project) are more relevant than their structural properties (i.e., out-degree and the size of the out-
component of the task) to preventing large-scale cascading failures. Our results suggest potential 
importance of changing timings of tasks, apart from the static structure of the same network of tasks, 
for containing project failure.  
  
Introduction 
Project-based processes are central in resolving major societal challenges1, from accelerating 
economic growth (e.g., delivering infrastructure projects2,3) to fostering public resilience (e.g., 
mobilising resources in response to a natural hazard4,5). As an example, World Bank data from 2009 
indicate that 22% of the world’s gross domestic products, which is equivalent to approximately $48 
trillion, relies almost entirely on project-based delivery mechanisms.6 Successfully delivering projects 
is a non-trivial task, partly due to the interdependent nature of tasks composing a project.7 A 2004 
report by PricewaterhouseCoopers concluded that out of 10,640 projects reviewed in 30 countries and 
across a variety of industries, with a total value of approximately €5 billion, only 254 were 
successfully delivered.8 A 2011 report concluded that out of 1,417 IT projects reviewed, 236 projects 
experienced cost overruns of at least 200% and the delivery of these projects was delayed by almost 
70% in time.9 Similar findings have also been reported elsewhere.10,11 Because project scales are 
predicted to increase in the future (e.g., 1.5-2.5% annual growth in value over the past century12), the 
implications of project failure are expected to increase even further.  
Research into understanding project failure can be broadly classified into two distinct, yet 
complementary, strands.13 Several studies focus on mapping the sociological factors that contribute to 
project failure (e.g., importance of leadership14,15 and corporate environment16). However, this strand 
of work is generally associated with a multitude of biases such as recollection bias (i.e., information 
bias in which recalled information is inaccurate) and self-report bias (i.e., behavioural bias in which 
participants over-report positive results), which challenges the integration of their findings to develop 
mitigation strategies against project failure.13 A second approach relies on computational methods17,18 
that model the conditions of project failure, from lacking a ‘healthy’ organisational culture19 to the 
propensity of wastefully repeating certain tasks.20 
In computational approaches, a project is typically viewed as a directed acyclic graph and often called 
activity network21, in which time-stamped nodes represent scheduled tasks (Figure 1). Directed edges 
between two nodes model functional dependencies between the two tasks. For example, a directed 
edge from node 𝑖 to node 𝑗 indicates that task 𝑖 must be completed before task 𝑗 begins. Because tasks 
are time-stamped, an activity network can be regarded as a temporal network.22-24 
 
Figure 1: Schematic of an activity network. A rounded rectangle represents a node (i.e., task). 
The grey rounded rectangles represent the tasks that may fail in response to a failure of the seed 
node shown in red.  
Early work on project failure focused on a particular failure scenario – delay propagation.25,26 Under 
this scenario, a delay in the completion of a single task can propagate throughout the activity network, 
eventually delaying the entire project. A similar scenario has been examined in the context of delay 
propagation in airport networks.27-29  Subsequent work on project failure has focussed on an 
alternative failure scenario in which changes in task specifications can trigger substantial rework in 
subsequent, downstream tasks and similarly affect the delivery of the overall project. In this case, a 
relatively minor change in the specifications of a single task can propagate across an entire project, 
severely affecting the overall project performance.30-32 
These scenarios of project failure, in which a delay or a change in the task specification that occurs in 
a single task propagate across the overall project, seem to be an exemplary type of a cascading failure 
on activity networks. By cascading failure we refer to iterative processes in which a single failure 
leads to subsequent failures, which can potentially lead to a system-wide failure33,34. Past studies 
attributed a diverse set of system-wide failures to cascading failures, including financial systemic 
risk35,36, the spread of misinformation37,38, and power blackouts39,40. Along this line, our recent studies 
tackled long-lasting project-management challenges using network analysis (e.g., assessing potential 
of conflict between sub-contractors)41 and associated certain project features with heightened 
vulnerability to cascading  failures42. However, both studies did not aim to provide specific mitigation 
strategies with which to contain failure cascades, which is the main focus of the present study.  
Robustness against cascading failures in networks can be engineered via structural or temporal 
mitigation schemes. Structural mitigation can be deployed when the structure of the network can be 
changed. For example, in power grids, one can modify the network structure to discourage the onset 
of large-scale cascades e.g., by introducing network modules or purposefully fragmenting the network 
before a cascade happens.43,44 However, some network systems that are susceptible to cascading 
failures may not accommodate structural mitigation. In this situation, temporal mitigation, i.e., 
changing the timing of nodes or edges without changing the static network structure, may be deployed 
without compromising the function of the system. For example, in air traffic networks where nodes 
and edges are airports and flights respectively, delaying flights is probably much easier than changing 
the destination of the flights as a preventive measure against cascading failures. One can implement a 
temporal mitigation scheme if nodes or edges have timestamps that are relatively flexible. In air 
traffic networks, every edge has a timestamp that corresponds to the flight’s scheduled departure time. 
An addition of a buffer between consecutive flights that depart from the same airport, which is a 
temporal mitigation strategy, may be able to suppress the likelihood of a small delay causing a 
system-wide delay.27,29 
In project management contexts, deploying structural mitigation in activity networks is not often 
feasible because a directed edge from task 𝑖 (e.g., designing a structural column for a building) to 
task 𝑗 (e.g., manufacturing that column) indicates that task 𝑖’s output is necessary for starting task 𝑗, 
and therefore cannot be amended. As such, our focus here is on temporal as opposed to structural 
mitigation.  
In the present study, we develop a simple cascading model which naturally lends itself to temporal 
active mitigation schemes. In other words, once a failure cascade is triggered, we deploy a mitigation 
scheme that modifies the start time of downstream tasks with the aim of suppressing cascading 
failures. To this end, we introduce a temporal element to the dynamics of these cascades by 
incorporating the impact of free float (i.e., the time between completion of task and the start of an 
immediately downstream task45) to a popular independent cascade model46. We then implement this 
model on an empirical activity network and numerically evaluate the performance of six mitigation 
schemes.  
Results 
The dataset is composed of a set of interconnected tasks that need to be completed for a commercial 
product in the area of defence to be delivered (see also Methods). The mean in- and out-degree of a 
task, which is regarded as a node of the directed temporal network, is equal to 1.69. The in-degree has 
standard deviation 4.45 and ranges from 0 to 90. A total of 111 nodes out of the 723 nodes has an in-
degree of 0; these tasks are located in the most upstream position in the network, and starting any of 
these tasks does not need any other task to be completed beforehand. The out-degree has standard 
deviation 2.82 and ranges from 0 to 52. A total of 32 nodes has an out-degree of 0; these tasks are 
located in the most downstream position in the network, and failure of any of these tasks does not 
cause a cascading failure. The in- and out-degree obeys somewhat long-tailed distributions (Figure 
2(a)), as is evidenced by their relatively large standard deviations as compared to the mean. The inter-
event time has the mean equal to 141.4 days, standard deviation 169.5 days, and ranges from 0 to 670 
days. The distribution of inter-event times is shown in Figure 2(b). The duration of task has the mean 
equal to 62.1 days, standard deviation 112.5 days, and ranges from 1 to 647 days. The distribution of 
the duration of tasks is shown in Figure 2(c). As time progresses, tasks are completed; the fraction of 
completed tasks by day is shown in Figure 2(d). The dataset of the temporal network of tasks, 
including the start time and end time of each task, is provided as Supplementary Information and 
available online (see Data Availability section). 
 
Figure 2: Distributions of basic properties of the temporal network of tasks. (a) Survival 
probability (i.e., probability that the degree is larger than or equal to a specified value) of the in- 
and out-degrees of the node. (b) Survival probability of the inter-event time. (c) Survival 
probability of the task duration. (d) Fraction of tasks that have been completed by day t, plotted 
against t. 
To model cascading of failures, we introduce a variation of the independent cascade model46. In our 
model, the probability that a failure propagates from an affected node 𝑖 to a non-affected downstream 
neighbour node of node 𝑖, denoted by 𝑗, is a function of the probability that the failure of node 𝑖 
causes the failure of node 𝑗 when there is no free float between the two nodes, which we denote by 𝑞0, 
and the free float between the two nodes, which we denote by 𝜏𝑖𝑗. We assume that the probability that 
the failure of node 𝑖 causes the failure of node 𝑗 decreases as 𝜏𝑖𝑗  increases because a larger 
𝜏𝑖𝑗  indicates that more time is available for containing the effect of task 𝑖’s failure on its downstream 
neighbours. Another parameter ?̃? controls the impact of the free float, 𝜏𝑖𝑗, on the probability that the 
failure of node 𝑖 causes the failure of node 𝑗. By definition, a large ?̃? value yields a small probability 
that the failure of node 𝑖 causes the failure of node 𝑗.  
We evaluate the performance of the six mitigation schemes in terms of their ability of containing 
cascading failures. These mitigation schemes attempt to increase 𝜏𝑖𝑗 for some 𝑖 and 𝑗 to reduce the 
probability that a failure cascades. Our focus is on the impact of the parameters that control the 
cascading dynamics (𝑞0 and ?̃?) and the fraction of the tasks to be postponed (𝛾). 
With a mitigation scheme, we postpone some of the tasks located downstream to the seed node that 
has failed (Figure 3; also see the grey nodes in Figure 1). Doing so increases some of the inter-event 
times in the nodes belonging to the out-component of the seed node (i.e., the nodes downstream to the 
seed node). Therefore, a mitigation scheme is expected to reduce the probability that the failure 
propagates. Precisely, the fraction of the nodes in the out-component of the seed node for which we 
postpone the start time is denoted by 𝛾 ∈ [0,1]. A mitigation scheme is ranking of nodes in the out-
component of the seed node. We sequentially postpone a fraction 𝛾 of these nodes in descending order 
of the rank. When postponing each task 𝑖 sequentially, we postpone it as much as possible under the 
following two conditions. First, adjacent tasks must not overlap. In other words, the end date of task 𝑖 
must not exceed the start date of any task 𝑗 that needs completion of task 𝑖. Second, the overall project 
duration must not be extended. In other words, the end date of task 𝑖 must not exceed the original 
delivery date of the project. 
We test six mitigation schemes, in which nodes to be mitigated are ranked based on either the (i) out-
degree, (ii) size of out-component (i.e., the number of nodes that are reachable from the node in 
question), (iii) duration of the task, (iv) start date of the task, (v) end date of the task or (vi) at random. 
For example, consider the network shown in the upper part of Figure 3(a) and assume that node 𝑣1 
fails. The subscript attached to the nodes in the figure represents the ranking in terms of the out-
degree. The figure indicates that node 𝑣3 is the first node to be mitigated (i.e., postponed). The 
amount of maximum postponement that can be applied to node 𝑣3 is constrained by the start date of 
its immediate neighbour, node 𝑣4. Therefore, we postpone node 𝑣3 such that its new end date is equal 
to the start date of node  𝑣4 (the network shown in the lower part of Figure 3(a)). Similarly, node 𝑣5 is 
postponed such that its new end date is equal to the start date of node 𝑣6. The same procedure is 
applied to node 𝑣2 and then to node 𝑣6. Note that postponing node 𝑣5 makes the inter-event time 
between node 𝑣5 and node 𝑣6 equal to zero. However, postponing node 𝑣6 subsequently increases the 
same inter-event time. We do not postpone the remaining two tasks with the lowest out-degrees, 
i.e., 𝑣4 and 𝑣7, because the fraction of the mitigated nodes, denoted by 𝛾, is set to 0.67 for illustration 
purposes, such that only four out of the six nodes downstream to node 𝑣1 can be mitigated. 
Implementation of three other mitigation schemes on the same network and the same 𝛾 value is 
schematically shown in Figures 3(b)-3(d).      
 Figure 3: An example illustrating the four mitigation schemes: (a) out-degree, (b) start date, (c) 
end date and (d) random. For each mitigation scheme, the top and bottom panels correspond to 
before and after the mitigation, respectively. Every node is ranked (subscript index) and 
postponed in that order. The tie is broken uniformly randomly. In all examples, we set 𝜸 =
𝟎. 𝟔𝟕 such that four out of the six tasks are mitigated. 
When 𝛾 = 1, the mitigation scheme based on the end date of the task outperforms the other five 
mitigation schemes. This is the case in terms of both performance measures 𝑅1(Figure 4) and 𝑅2 
(Figure 5). Quantities 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 measure the relative and absolute reduction in the cascade size by a 
mitigation scheme (see Methods for the definitions). These figures also show that, apart from the 
mitigation scheme based on the end date of the task, the random mitigation scheme outperforms the 
other four mitigation schemes. The relative ranking of the six mitigation schemes is consistent in the 
whole range of 𝑞0 and ?̃? ∈ [1, 10, 10
2, 103], except for ?̃? = 103, where there are some rank changes 
presumably due to random fluctuations. Note that as ?̃? tends large (?̃? ≥ 103), 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is approximately 
equal to 𝑞0 regardless of the size of 𝜏𝑖𝑗 and regardless of the mitigation scheme. Therefore, 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 
converge to 1 for any 𝑞0 as ?̃? increases (see Supplementary Figure 1 for numerical results with ?̃? =
104 and ?̃? = 105).   
 Figure 4: Performance of the six mitigation schemes in terms of 𝑹𝟏, as a function of 𝒒𝟎. (a) ?̃? =
𝟏. (b) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎. (c) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎𝟐. (d) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎𝟑. We set 𝜸 = 𝟏. 
 
 
 Figure 5: Performance of the six mitigation schemes in terms of 𝑹𝟐, as a function of 𝒒𝟎. (a) ?̃? =
𝟏. (b) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎. (c) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎𝟐. (d) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎𝟑. We set 𝜸 = 𝟏. 
To investigate the entire parameter space where the fraction of mitigated nodes, 𝛾, is also varied, we 
identified the mitigation scheme that was the most efficient, i.e., that yielding the smallest value of 𝑅1 
and 𝑅2, when we varied 𝑞0, ?̃? and 𝛾. The results in terms of 𝑅1 are shown in Figure 6. When there is 
little variation between the best and worst performing schemes (less than 1%; arbitrarily chosen; 
white regions labelled ‘Unspecified’ in Figure 6), we argue that no best mitigation scheme exists. 
Figure 6 reveals two parameter regimes. First, when 𝛾 ≥ 0.8, the mitigation scheme based on either 
the out-degree, duration, end date or at random performs the best, depending on the specific 
combination of 𝛾 and 𝑞0 values. As ?̃? increases from 1 to 10
3,  the mitigation scheme based on the 
end date tends to be consistently the best in this parameter regime (Figure 6(d)). Second, when 𝛾 <
0.8, the mitigation scheme based on the start date tends to be the best performing mitigation scheme 
across the entire range of 𝑞0 and ?̃?. The results in terms of 𝑅2 (Supplementary Figure 2) are similar to 
those in terms of 𝑅1 (Figure 6). 
 Figure 6: Best performing mitigation scheme in terms of  𝑹𝟏 in the parameter space spanned by 
𝒒𝟎 and 𝜸. (a) ?̃? = 𝟏. (b) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎. (c) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎
𝟐. (d) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎𝟑. 
Discussion 
We modelled project failures as cascading failures on networks composed of tasks constituting the 
project. The model incorporates both structural and temporal features of activity networks of projects. 
We implemented six mitigation schemes by postponing a fraction 𝛾 of tasks downstream to the task 
that has failed. When one was allowed to postpone all the tasks downstream to the task that has failed, 
our numerical results indicated that it was more efficient to prioritise task mitigation according to the 
end date of each task than the other five mitigation schemes. When one was allowed to postpone a 
relatively small fraction of tasks, it was generally more efficient to postpone tasks based on their start 
date. Some additional cases existed where the mitigation scheme based on the out-degree or duration 
of the task was the most efficient. Specifically, when 𝛾 is large, either the mitigation scheme based on 
the out-degree, that based on the duration, or that based on the end-date was the best. These numerical 
results suggest that, in a majority of the parameter region that we have explored, temporal features of 
the tasks, such as the duration, start date, and end date of the task, may be as important as structural 
features such as the out-degree of the task, for preventing large-scale cascading failures of projects. 
The present modelling framework has limitations. First, our analysis has focused only on the benefits 
of deploying mitigation in the form of postponing the start date of tasks. However, postponing tasks 
may increase the number of active tasks on particular days, which is generally associated with poor 
project performance due to an increased cost or decreased quality.20,47,48 Future work should consider 
this drawback in conjunction with the benefits potentially gained through the mitigation mechanisms 
proposed in the present study. Second, from a methodological standpoint, our approach is limited by 
the single pass in which mitigation is applied to tasks. Consider the example shown in Figure 3(a), in 
which node 𝑣5 was postponed before node 𝑣6 was. In this case, the amount of postponement is 
constrained by the start date of node 𝑣6. Postponing node 𝑣6 at a later stage opens up the opportunity 
for node 𝑣5 to be further postponed, which is currently not exploited. One can exploit this opportunity 
to explore further improvements in mitigation efficiency. Third, a mitigation scheme can be classified 
into passive and active. In a passive mitigation scheme, one modifies the structure or time stamps of 
the activity network before a cascade is possibly seeded. In contrast, in an active mitigation scheme, 
one modifies the activity network while a cascade is progressing. In the present study, we focused on 
active mitigation schemes. Carefully planning the start time of each task, given, for example, the 
network structure and the possibility of different tasks to fail with different probabilities, may consist 
in a plausible passive mitigation scheme on the activity network. This topic also warrants future work.  
Despite these and other possible limitations, we believe that the present modelling framework serves 
as a stepping stone for future work for exploring whether causal relationships exist between structural 
and/or temporal features of temporal networks of tasks and mitigation efficiency.  
Methods 
Data 
The data set corresponds to a list of 𝑁 = 723 planned activities, which we refer to as tasks, that need 
to be completed for a commercial product in the area of defence to be delivered. The overall duration 
of the project is 745 days. Each task has a scheduled start and end date (and hence the duration). The 
resolution of the time is a day. The dependency between a pair of tasks is represented by a directed 
edge. There are 1,220 directed edges in total. The directed edge from task 𝑖 to 𝑗, denoted by 𝑒𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝐸, 
indicates that the output of task 𝑖, such as information or a physical artefact (i.e., product), is an input 
to task 𝑗. A directed edge form task 𝑖 to task 𝑗 implies that task 𝑖 must be completed before task 𝑗 
starts. Therefore, task 𝑗 can start only after all tasks that send a directed edge to task 𝑗 have been 
completed. The 723 activities as nodes and the 1,220 edges define an activity network, which is a 
time-stamped directed acyclic graph. The number of predecessors and successors of each task is equal 
to the task’s in-degree and out-degree, respectively. 
The free float between task 𝑖 and 𝑗 is defined as the difference, in days, between the completion of 
task 𝑖 and the start of task 𝑗 45. The free float is equivalent to a widely used term, inter-event time.22-24 
We denote the free float between 𝑖 and 𝑗 as 𝜏𝑖𝑗.   
Cascading failure model  
We use a discrete-time cascading failure model with binary states of the node, which is analogous to 
the independent cascade model46 and other cascade-failure models33. The final state of node 𝑗 
(1 ≤   𝑗 ≤  𝑁) is denoted by 𝑠𝑗 ∈ [0,1], where ‘0’ and ‘1’ correspond to the non-affected and 
affected state, respectively. We start the cascade dynamics from an initial condition, where one seed 
node (which can be any node) is in state 1 and all the other 𝑁 − 1 nodes are in state 0. During the 
cascade dynamics, node 𝑗 may irreversibly switch from state 0 to state 1 if node 𝑗 has at least one 
upstream neighbour that is in state 1. 
We determine the final state of each node (and hence the final cascade size) by marking the nodes one 
by one as follows. Note that the results do not depend on the order of marking the nodes. Initially, the 
seed node is the only marked node (i.e., finalised to state 1) in the network. During the course of the 
following procedure, all nodes that are yet to be marked have state 0. Marked nodes have state either 
0 or 1. In each round, we pick an unmarked node 𝑗 whose all upstream neighbours have been marked. 
The first node to be marked after the seed node is a node that does not have any upstream neighbour 
(i.e., in-degree equal to 0) or a node that has the seed node as the only upstream neighbour. In the 
former case, the node selected for marking is typically a task that starts the earliest in time. To 
determine the final state of node 𝑗 (i.e., to mark node 𝑗), we assume that the failure of each upstream 
neighbour of node 𝑗, referred to as node 𝑖, independently causes node 𝑗 to fail with probability 𝑝𝑖𝑗. 
Then, we set the final state of node 𝑗 to 1 with probability 
 𝑃𝑗 = 1 − ∏ [(1 − 𝑠𝑖) + 𝑠𝑖(1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗)]
 
𝑖; 𝑒𝑖𝑗∈𝐸
,        (1) 
 
where 𝐸 is the set of edges. Otherwise, we set the final state of node 𝑗 to 0. In eq. (1), the product term 
is the probability that node 𝑗 does not fail, and each factor in the product is the probability that node 𝑖 
does not cause the failure of node 𝑗. If 𝑠𝑖 = 0, this probability is equal to 1. If 𝑠𝑖 = 1, this probability 
is equal to  1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑗. Once the state of node 𝑗 is determined in this manner, we mark node 𝑗 and select a 
next unmarked node such that all its upstream neighbours have been marked.  
To set the value of 𝑝𝑖𝑗, we consider the impact of time between the completion of task 𝑖 and start of 
task 𝑗 (i.e., inter-event time, denoted by 𝜏𝑖𝑗). We reason that a large inter-event time reduces the 
probability that task 𝑖’s failure propagates to task 𝑗, because an inter-event time gives spare time to 
dispense appropriate resources to mitigate the effect of task 𝑖’s failure.49,50 Reducing inter-event times 
has been suggested to increase the risk of failure propagation as well.51 Therefore, we assume that 
 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑞0 exp (−
𝜏𝑖𝑗
?̃?
) ,        (2) 
 
where 𝑞0 ∈ [0,1] and ?̃?(>  0) are parameters. Parameter 𝑞0 is the probability that task 𝑗 fails if task 𝑖 
does and there is no spare time between the two tasks, i.e., 𝜏𝑖𝑗 = 0. Equation (2) indicates that if the 
two tasks are far apart in time, it is not likely that failure of one task triggers failure of a successor 
task. Parameter ?̃? controls the strength of this time dependence. 
Mitigation schemes 
By the construction of our model, increasing an inter-event time reduces the probability that failure 
propagates from a task to another. Therefore, postponing the start of a downstream task is expected to 
reduce the probability of its failure. We use this mechanism as a mitigation scheme. A mitigation 
scheme has to respect the end date of the entire project; no task can be postponed beyond the delivery 
date of the entire project. Furthermore, any downstream neighbour of task 𝑗 is only allowed to start 
after task 𝑗 has been completed. Therefore, the extent of postponing task 𝑗 is further constrained by the 
start date of its downstream neighbours. Note that we allow the end date of task 𝑗 to coincide with the 
start date of its downstream neighbour, in which case the inter-event time is equal to zero.  
The mitigation scheme is implemented as follows. Once seed node 𝑖 fails, all nodes reachable from 
node 𝑖 along a directed path (i.e., nodes belonging to the out-component of node 𝑖), which can fail, are 
rank ordered based on the node’s score. The score of these nodes is equal to one of the following six 
quantities: out-degree, size of the out-component (i.e., the number of nodes that are reachable from 
the node to be scored), duration of the task, start date of the task, end date of the task, or an entirely 
randomly drawn value. When multiple nodes have identical scores, we break the tie by ranking the 
nodes having the same score in a uniformly random order. 
We denote by ?̃? the rank-ordered set of the nodes downstream to node 𝑖. In the example shown in 
Figure 3a, in which the rank is determined according to the out-degree of the task, we obtain ?̃? =
{𝑣3, 𝑣5, 𝑣2, 𝑣6, 𝑣4, 𝑣7}. Parameter 𝛾 ∈ [0,1] specifies the fraction of nodes in ?̃? that are to be mitigated. 
In Figure 3(a), we set 𝛾 = 0.67. Therefore, the four highest-ranked nodes out of the six nodes, i.e., 
𝑣3, 𝑣5, 𝑣2 and 𝑣6, are mitigated. Node 𝑣3 is first postponed until its end date coincides with the start 
date of its downstream neighbour 𝑣4. Next, the same postponement process is applied to node 𝑣5, 
node 𝑣2 and then node 𝑣6. The temporal network after the mitigation is shown in the lower part of 
Figure 3(a).  
In the example shown in Figure 3(a), the probability that the failure of node 𝑣1 propagates to node 𝑣2 
has been reduced because 𝜏𝑣1𝑣2 has been increased. This is a positive effect of mitigation that we have 
intended. However, in the same example, the probability that the failure of node 𝑣2 propagates to 
node 𝑣3 has been increased compared to the case of the unmitigated activity network, because the 
mitigation has decreased 𝜏𝑣2𝑣3. This is a negative effect of mitigation that we have not intended. 
Performance measures for mitigation schemes, 𝑅1 and 𝑅2 
We measure the performance of each mitigation scheme in terms of two quantities. The first 
quantity, denoted by 𝑅1, is defined as the cascade size that stems from a seed node when the 
mitigation scheme is implemented, divided by the cascade size when there is no mitigation, averaged 
over all seed nodes. Quantity 𝑅1 captures the relative impact of mitigation in the sense that the 
contribution of mitigating a large cascade is equivalent to that of mitigating a small cascade. The 
second quantity, denoted by 𝑅2, is defined as the cascade size averaged over all seed nodes when the 
mitigation is applied, which is then divided by the cascade size averaged over all seed nodes when no 
mitigation is applied. Quantity 𝑅2 captures the absolute impact of mitigation in the sense that 
mitigating a large cascade is considered to be more valuable than mitigating a small cascade. A small 
𝑅1 or 𝑅2 value indicates that the mitigation scheme is efficient. 
For the given values of 𝑞0, ?̃?, 𝛾, and the given seed node, we ran the cascading dynamics 100 times 
(except for Supplementary Figure 1, for which we ran the simulation 300 times). In the figures we 
show the average values of the observables over all runs. 
Data Availability 
The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available in the GitHub 
repository, https://github.com/naokimas/project_network. 
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Supplementary Figure 1: Performance of the six mitigation schemes for larger values of ?̃?. (a) 
𝑹𝟏 when ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎
𝟒. (b) 𝑹𝟏 when ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎
𝟓. (c) 𝑹𝟐 when ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎
𝟒. (d) 𝑹𝟐 when ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎
𝟓.  
 Supplementary Figure 2: Best performing mitigation scheme in terms of 𝑹𝟐 in the parameter 
space spanned by  𝒒𝟎 and 𝜸. (a) ?̃? = 𝟏. (b) ?̃? =. (c) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎
𝟐. (d) ?̃? = 𝟏𝟎𝟑. 
 
 
 
